Abstract
Introduction
In recent years, an increasing amount of research and development has been targeted at location-aware applications. These applications can be categorized into information, tracing, resource management and navigation services.
In this paper we introduce security services as an additional category. Location-based security services facilitate functions such as audit and access control based on the location of a subscriber. This paper discusses how assurance of location can be provided through tamper-resistance, as well as detailing a method of tamper-resistance specific to GSM. In addition, we present a framework for obtaining assured location from a GSM phone and demonstrate the integration of location-based security services in two common Internet applications.
Location-based security services
There are numerous applications of location-based security services, a small number of which include the enforcement of export controls and software licensing, prevention of access to confidential data, and restriction of fund transfers to foreign banks based on the location of an account holder. Security services used for applications such as these can be categorized into two types:
1. Access Control Services: Where access is granted to an authenticated entity based on the entity's location; and 2. Security Audit Services: Where security audit information is enhanced with the location of an entity or entities that are involved in an audited action.
Location-based authentication services may appear to be absent, however on closer inspection it can be reasoned that location cannot be used as an authentication metric.
A number of previous research contributions [1] , [6] refer to a concept of "location authentication". The location of an entity in no way establishes the identity of that entity, and as such, location cannot be used for authentication in its own right. Location authentication is in fact two distinctly separate operations, the verification of an entity's identity, and authorization of an entity's access based on their location. Identity is typically established through a combination of knowledge, possession and biometrics.
Previous work in location tamper-resistance
Using location for security services was rarely considered in the past due to the ease in which location acquisition devices could be tampered with. Denning and MacDoran in [1] introduced the first GPS-based location authorization system, the "Cyber Locator", using a patented method of location determination [7] to provide assurance of location integrity. This system uses raw GPS signals to derive a location signature, where both the client and server have the same view of satellites.
In terms of tamper-resistance, Denning and MacDoran in [1] claim that the prediction or impersonation of a location signature is impossible due to satellite orbit perturbations, which are not determinable in real-time. The location signature used for authentication is only valid for 5ms, based on the network lag between the client and the server. While this system may be successful at preventing replay attacks or forgery, it is not necessarily resistant to location spoofing. Kan in [5] stipulates that this system is vulnerable if an attacker is able to record GPS satellite signals and reassemble the aggregate signal with the appropriate delays for the spoofed location.
Gabber and Wool in [4] propose a number of solutions for customer equipment tracking using various location technologies including GPS and cell phones. This paper identifies a number of vulnerabilities with the use of GPS including the lack of trust of a GPS reciever, the inability to detect the generation of fake satellite signals, and the ability to easily perform low-power GPS jamming. Cellular location determination is identified as a viable possibility for equipment tracking, based on their assumption that network-calculated location can be trusted, assuming the network infrastructure is not tampered with. A number of attacks based on extending the transmitting antenna from a illegitimate location to a legitimate location are discussed. This paper does not propose any solutions to the vulnerabilities that are discussed.
Subsequently, Looi in [6] proposed an "Internet challenge authentication scheme" that made use of GSM cell phones as an authentication token for Internet-based applications. The user was authenticated by a one-time password (OTP) sent via SMS (Short Message Service). Location information was obtained from the phone through the encoded OTP response and used for access control, as well as an enhancement to audit facilities.
The location information was calculated from the signal strengths of known neighboring BTSs (Base Transceiver Stations) obtained from the handset. An issue with this proposal was the ease with which the location information could be spoofed as demonstrated by the following methods:
Restriction of the number of available channels:
This has the affect of significantly reducing the accuracy of a location calculation. The method was validated with a Nokia cell phone using the "BTS Test" function of the Net-monitor interface. Net-monitor is easily activated and provides a number of monitoring functions both of the network and phone. The BTS Test function forces the phone to only respond to a predetermined BCCH (Broadcast Channel), thus allowing the phone to use any BTS with sufficient signal strength. In the test we conducted, the phone was forced to communicate exclusively with the furtherest BTS, resulting in a location calculation error of 3.803km.
2. Manipulation of the radio environment to affect the RX level reported for each observed channel: This is the easiest method to influence the location calculation. We conducted a test using aluminum foil at certain angles within close proximity to the cell phone's antenna, such that line-of-sight signals from the nearest BTS were blocked. The result was a calculation error of 1.506km.
3. Modification of the handset to provide false measurements: This method of spoofing could potentially locate the phone wherever a malicious user desires, as long as the channels and CID reported are in the database used for correlation. The software within the phone would have to be modified to provide false measurements to the interfaces that acquire the information. While this method requires significantly more effort than the previous methods, it has the ability to yield the best results.
Location determination technology is not 100% accurate. Inevitably a percentage of objects are falsely granted or denied access to a subject due to inaccuracies in measuring or obtaining the metric. Because the location information is being used for security purposes such as access control, the location determination technologies must exhibit some form of tamper-resistance, otherwise the metric may be deceptive in providing a false assurance of security. Tamper-resistance of location measurements, as demonstrated in this paper, can provide a reasonable level of assurance, such that attacking or spoofing is possible only with significant financial means and by highly motivated attackers.
Properties of tamper-resistant measurements
The purpose of tamper-resistance is to make the location intractable, such that it is not financially viable to manipulate the location data. For location measurements to exhibit some form of assurance, they must have properties that make them resistant to spoofing or tampering. These properties are used in the criteria below to form a set of prerequisites that must be satisfied for a location measurement to be assured:
1. The source of the measurements used to calculate the location must be verifiable: An example of this property is where signal propagation timing is used to calculate location. The origin of the signal must be authenticated, such that a fake signal can be identified.
2. Measurements used to calculate the location must be able to facilitate tamper detection: An example of this property is a measurement that must be correct in order for the device to communicate, such that a signal cannot be delayed or transmitted early in order to masquerade the real distance of a MS (Mobile Station) from a BTS. This is an inherent property of measurements used for adaptive frame alignment in TDMA (Time Division Multiple Access).
3. Measurements must be network based: These are measurements that are obtained solely from the network. If the network-based measurements are partly based on MS functionality, this functionality must be trusted. An example is the transmission of signal bursts in GSM, such that timing of transmitted bursts is as dictated by the network. A secure bootstrap could be used to validate the software that controls the timing of transmissions. A number of GSM chip-sets already have this functionality built in. The use of measurements obtained from a MS assume that the MS can be trusted to make observations without modification. Tamper-resistant MSs are outside the scope of this paper, but may provide a workable solution. In the case of network based measurements, it is assumed that the network provider and infrastructure are trusted. This criteria can also be applied to location technologies other than GSM such as GPS. GPS fails the first criteria, as the source of GPS signals used for calculating the location (when using P-Code) cannot be verified. A GPS receiver is unable to differentiate between a legitimate and fake signal transmission. Y-Code (an encrypted version of P-code) provides such origin authentication, but is reserved exclusively for U.S. military use. GPS also fails the third and fourth criteria, as the location is calculated by the GPS receiver.
In GSM, the TA (Timing Advance) measurement, used to advance the timing of a MS due to the outbound propagation delay, is an example of a measurement that complies with most prerequisites of the tamper-resistant measurement criteria. It exhibits tamper-resistance in that it is required for successful communication using TDMA, it is a network-based measurement, and it is calculated by the network operator. The exact tamper-resistant properties and limitations of this measurement will be detailed in the following subsections.
TA as a tamper-resistant measurement
GSM uses TDMA to share carrier frequencies with multiple users. Each TDMA frame has 8 slots, providing each user with the carrier frequency for 0.577ms. A time-slot has 156.25 bit periods, the last 8.25 bit periods being the guard allowing a maximum of 8 bit periods of timing error before an adjacent slot is corrupted.
The TA is used to adjust the timing to get the MS within the (slot + guard) if the phone is within approximately 35km of the BTS. The MS has to advance its timing by the roundtrip propagation time, because its time is ¡ s off the BTS' time due to the outbound propagation delay, and then it has to allow for another ¡ s for the way back.
The TA can be used to calculate the distance of the MS from the BTS with a granularity of 550 meters, such that [2] . The TA measurement is typically used to calculate the radius of an MS's location area:
, where £ = calculated distance between MS and BTS. The distance is A 275 meters due to the TA being rounded to the nearest bit period, such that
; and so on.
The initial TA estimation is obtained via the "Immediate Assignment" layer 3 message when the MS transmits an access burst on the RACH (Random Access Channel). The BTS detects a burst transmission on the RACH and measures the delay of the signal relative to the expected signal from an MS at 0 distance. To keep track of the propagation delay, normal bursts sent by the MS are monitored by the BTS. Changes to the delay by more than 1 bit period result in the advancement or retardation of the TA by 1 bit period.
The MS must time its transmissions according to signals received from the BTS, such that transmissions measured at the MS antenna are 1 bit period. The affects of this may be apparent near TA boundaries.
The timing advance measurement can be obtained either from the MS or network operator and can be used to determine the distance an MS is from a given BTS. This measurement is only available from the serving cell when the MS is in active mode, although when idle the MS may be paged without the subscriber noticing.
Limitations of TA as a location measurement
There is one known limitation of the TA as a location measurement. The MS must be trusted to time its transmissions according to signals received from the BTS, such that transmissions measured at the MS antenna are (3 time-slots) -TA bit periods behind the transmission received from the BTS [3] . It is possible that MS could advance all its transmissions by dist. of MS to BTS C bit periods. Cellular phones/devices typically have GSM implemented in a single chip or chip-set, where the ability to control such parameters would not be available. Significant engineering skills and reasonable finances would be required to perform such an attack.
Proposed method for obtaining location with a high level of assurance
The proposed location system uses the GCID (Global Cell ID) and the TA measurements for calculating the location. A number of constraints on the use of these measurements are defined in this section, such that the calculated location exhibits some properties of tamper-resistance. In addition, a different representation of the location area is used to ensure the location provided by the system encapsulates the entire area an MS could possibly be in. This method provides a higher assurance of location than the commonly used GCID-based location, as a user is able to easily spoof their location by forcing a handover to the furtherest visible BTS. The TA in effect ensures such activity is detected.
One of the unique features of the TA is that it must be approximately correct in order for the MS to transmit in the correct slot. Because transmissions must be timed such that they arrive in the correct time-slot at the BTS, the delay of transmissions can't exceed the guard period, otherwise the transmitted burst would collide with an adjacent burst. As such, the TA must be correct beyond the guard period otherwise transmission will be corrupted. A guard of 8.25 bit periods in effect means that the effective radius of any cell without timing advance can be a maximum of 4400m based on 550m per bit period. This means that locations within this area can be undetectably spoofed.
In terms of the measurement granularity provided by TA values, a TA measurement less than 9 cannot be assured. The TA can be spoofed for values less than 9 due to the size of the guards as detailed in section 4. A TA of 9 is equivalent to a maximum of 4675m, which is therefore the minimum distance before the TA is tamper-resistant. As such, the MS is assured of being between 0 and 4675m where the TA is less than 9. For TA values greater than 9 and less than 63, the MS is assured of being between 4675 and 34925m. The value of 34925m is the maximum distance (
, where 63 is the maximum timing advance supported by standard GSM [3] ) In addition, the propagation path cannot be assumed to be a direct line-of-sight as the signal may travel a longer path. What can be assumed is that the minimum timing advance that can be obtained is the TA representing the signal propagating the line-of-sight. This assumption holds true, as radio waves cannot exceed the speed of light in order to arrive at the BTS earlier.
This provides us with a fundamental grounding for tamper-resistance, in that an MS attempting to spoof its location from a distant location will have a timing advance indicative of at least the minimum line-of-sight distance between the BTS and the MS A 1 bit period of tolerance. As such, a malicious user cannot spoof their location by use of a high gain antenna or other means of extending the antenna, whilst being up to 35km away from the desired BTS. The attacks based on antenna extension described by Gabber and Wool in [4] can therefore be detected by the TA measurement.
Practical use of the TA in a location system
In order to implement a location solution based on the proposed method, it is necessary to define a maximum allowable distance from a cell. For example: Given a cell 0001, let the maximum allowable distance from the BTS be 4675m, such that the line-of-sight distance from the BTS must be less than 4675m. dist max false It is possible that the MS in example 2 was legitimate but was adversely affected by the environment it was in. Under certain circumstances, the TA will be greater than the required minimum TA due to propagation effects in the environment of the MS. (Test results in table 1 illustrate this effect.) In this case a potentially legitimate user will be denied access. It is important to note that the TA calculation is based on the first arrived propagation path that has a significant RX level. The use of training sequence bits in signal bursts for equalization ensure that out of phase reflected signals are discarded. As such, the TA should represent the line-of-sight propagation path in most cases. In these results, the initial Timing Advance estimate contained a timing error less than 1 bit period. This caused the TA, after rounding, to be less than the line-of-sight distance. This was corrected shortly after the initial TA estimate. These results have identified issues in the TA accuracy caused by bit rounding. This tends to be an issue close to the TA boundaries. It can be stipulated that the more time a given BTS has to calculate the TA, more accurate it will be. The initial TA estimate tends to be less accurate than the TA of a MS in the same fixed location after a short period of time has elapsed.
Location at this accuracy can be used for numerous applications including credit card transaction audits for mcommerce applications or authorization to perform an Internet banking transfer. In this case, suburb-level granularity is acceptable. To increase the accuracy of the location system, it may be necessary to perform a forced handover onto a cell in the required area. This can be performed either by the network operator or the MS. A forced handover has been achieved with an Ericsson TEMS phone by modifying layer 3 measurement report messages, such that the received signal level (RX level) reported for cells other than the required one is 0.
This location determination method requires no changes to current GSM infrastructure. A significant advantage of this implementation, is that it only requires a GSM network with the appropriate location services implemented. All the information required for location calculation is already obtainable from any LCS98 compliant location system. Our prototype has been developed using the Ericsson Mobile Location Solution and the MPP (Mobile Positioning Protocol) version 4.0 [8] .
Additional fields could be added to the MPP that quantify assurance of the measurements required and returned.
For example, the initial TA estimation may be less accurate than the TA obtained after channel establishment. Hence, the method of obtaining the location measurement could be adapted to accommodate the assurance level specified.
Location-based auditing and access control
This section discusses how location assurance mechanisms can be used in security services. For audit applications, location data is comprised of the
coordinates of a BTS and the radius of the circular area containing a MS. An example of an audit application is a credit card payment protocol that adds the location of a MS to the transaction audit. To ensure the location area is not too large, there may optionally be an access control decision to limit the size of the TA where closer BTSs are available.
In the case of access control, ACLs (Access Control Lists) must contain the necessary location data to make authorization decisions. An ACL is associated with every object in a system and determines the permissions of a user or role on a given object by the membership of that user in the ACL.
In the proposed location-based access control system, ACLs would contain the object ID, user/role IDs, object permissions, and the location at which these permissions are valid. A single ACL can have many permissions, each with the ability to contain many location areas. A permission has a operation mode of allow or deny as denoted by "LAC MODE" in figure 1 , such that either a given permission is only valid in the associated location areas, or is valid for all locations except the associated location areas. In this way, access control logic of an application only grants permissions based on location constraints being met. coordinates that form a closed area. We use a vector-based data format as it is more accurate and can offer quick tests to determine whether the location of a MS in inside the polygon. To test whether a given MS location is within the defined location area, we propose a two-step approach:
1. Determine if the BTS coordinates are inside the polygon using the Jordan curve theorem.
2. Determine if the MS circular location area is within the polygon using the equation: This equation can be used to determine whether the polygon intersects with the circular location area of the MS. If not, it can be assumed that the circular location area is within the polygon. The access control mechanism can either grant or deny access to a user depending on whether the location area is within the polygon.
Securing Internet applications using locationbased access control and auditing
There are a number of prerequisites for the use of location services, the most important of which is the association of the location acquisition device to the corresponding user's session. This can be achieved by authenticating the location acquisition device, proving that it is in the possession of a legitimate user for a given user's session. Conceptually, this method of association can operate using all existing GSM cell phones. We propose the use of a OTP (One Time Password) using a covert data channel, the GSM network, to transmit the random challenge to the user.
The user who is in possession of the GSM cell phone, enters a username and password into the their application session to access the service. If successfully authenticated to the application service, a random challenge is generated by an authentication server and sent via the GSM network to the user's cell phone. The user then enters this random challenge into the appropriate field in the application session, which is subsequently verified by an authentication server. This method can be described in terms of two types of services: web services and WAP (Wireless Application Protocol) services. Conceptually, the method is the same in both types of services, however there are significant differences in implementation and network infrastructure used.
Phone association for web services
Association of a phone to a web session is particularly important when using web services, as the session is typically not terminated at the phone, but rather at another terminal. In order to associate the phone to a web session, there must be an authentication that ties the phone to the web session. This is done using the method described in the previous subsection. It is assumed that web sessions are protected by SSL (Secure Sockets Layer). Figure 2 illustrates how the authentication takes place.
Initial authentication to session:
The user authenticates to the service. This initial authentication prevents malicious users from flooding a user with OTPs.
OTP authentication request:
The web service sends a request to the authentication server to perform authentication of a given user.
Dispatch OTP:
The authentication server retrieves the user's registered phone number and generates a OTP. This OTP with the destination number is dispatched to the SMSC (Short Message Service Center) as a class 0 SMS message for delivery to the user's phone. A class 0 message appears on the screen on the user's cell phone without any user interaction and without being stored in the user's SIM card.
User enters the OTP in the web session:
When the user receives the OTP on their cell phone, the OTP is then typed into the appropriate authentication field of a web page in the web session.
Verify OTP:
The web server sends the OTP provided by the client to the authentication server for verification. This process provides some assurance that the user who is using a web session is the same user that possesses the phone. When the location of this device is obtained, one can be reasonably satisfied that the located phone is the same phone that was authenticated. 
Credit card audit example
There are many proprietary fraud protection technologies available from a multitude of credit card vendors, however many of these fail because of the number of different technologies merchants must support and the lack of support by the majority of merchants. This results in no benefit in terms of protecting a persons credit card from fraud, both in terms of revenue protection for credit card companies and for the credit card holder.
Location auditing is independent of credit cards and their associated systems. Location auditing can provide credit card companies and merchants with a new level of revenue protection that works over all credit cards as well as other payment types. This technology is particularly useful in mcommerce applications, where cell phones are already being used in a transaction.
The basis of this system is the attachment of location data to a credit card transaction. Location data must be certified by a third party such as a network operator and stored by the merchant, or a trusted third party that is entrusted to perform the location acquisitions, requiring users register with the third party.
The centralized model is the easiest to realize and also provides better support for user location privacy. A user can simply register with the service and the merchant can invoke the service for a credit card transaction. The location audit proves that a user made a transaction in a given location area. If credit card fraud occurs, it is then up to the credit card holder to prove that they were not in the audited location.
The current Internet credit card system, based entirely on a credit card number and expiry, provides no proof that a credit card holder who claims they possess the credit card number and expiry is the credit card owner. This is traditionally assured by a signature. In effect, the merchant has no basis other that a possible delivery address to defend a disputed payment. While this system is advantageous to merchants and credit card companies, it may not be so attractive to credit card holders. Incentives could be offered such that credit card holders who register qualify for a reduced interest rate for example.
Internet banking example
Internet banking is a common and popular Internet application that could significantly benefit from location access control and audit. An example of banking functionality that location-based access control logic could be added to is internal and external fund transfers. Table 2 shows some hypothetical high-level permissions for transfers based on location constraints and a phone-session association.
Location information Permissions No cell phone
Account balance and transaction history information only Cell phone association, and location acquisition unavailable Ability to transfer between the user's accounts only Cell phone association, and in unregistered location area Ability to transfer up to $500 to any bank account Cell phone association, and in registered location area Ability to transfer up to transfer limit ($50,000) to any bank account Table 2 . Account transfer access control influenced by location.
The association status is also used as a constraint in that the cell phone association better establishes the identity of the Internet banking user. The association provides 2-factor authentication of the user as well as authenticating the phone.
A user who is in an incorrect location must already have a cell phone association in order for the location to be used. As such, the permissions assigned to cell phone association are combined with that of "unregistered" and "registered" location. It is possible that the location can not be obtained even though the user has successfully associated the phone to the session.
Due to the potential cost and performance overhead of obtaining the location information from the network operator on a continual basis, it is envisaged that the user's location would be obtained once during a session to determine the session permissions, and then for each transaction to validate the operation is still valid. The location obtained for each transaction will also serve as a location audit for the transaction.
An access control scheme such as this is very cost effective in providing enhanced security through the use of cell phone association (two factor authentication) and location access control and audit, in that no costly tokens or equipment needs to be issued from the bank. The only cost is SMS / WAP Push messages and location requests.
Conclusion
This paper has introduced location-based security services and the requirement for tamper-resistant location services. A new model for tamper-resistant location acquisition using GSM cell phones has been demonstrated and related to two types of security services, location-based access control and audit. It also has provided a basic set of criteria from which future research into 3rd generation cellular location and other location technologies can be pursued. In addition, a framework for implementing these services in both web and WAP Internet applications has been detailed, discussing two example applications for which locationbased security services could be used.
